{
  "study": "vpn-censorship-event-study",
  "label": "DOCUMENT",
  "frozen_at": "2026-11-17T14:57:00Z",
  "note": "Purposive sample of documented VPN/censorship events. Claims here are literature synthesis, not in-country re-measurement by FreePolicyTools.",
  "events": [
    {
      "id": "E1",
      "title": "Russia: fluctuating VPN protocol disruption (2023\u20132024)",
      "countries": [
        "RU"
      ],
      "period": "2023-01 to 2024-12 (documented waves)",
      "mechanism_as_reported": "TSPU/DPI devices; temporary and regional disruption of OpenVPN, IKEv2, WireGuard, and IPsec; collateral damage sometimes limited duration; website and media blocking also documented.",
      "primary_sources": [
        {
          "org": "OONI",
          "title": "Censorship Chronicles: The systematic suppression of independent media in Russia",
          "url": "https://ooni.org/post/2024-russia-report/",
          "published": "2024-12-09"
        }
      ],
      "what_we_measure_here": "USA cloud reachability of named circumvention-tool websites only. Protocol-level in-country blocks are DOCUMENT-only.",
      "what_we_do_not_claim": "That WireGuard/OpenVPN tunnels fail or succeed from this USA VM; that any paid VPN product is ranked."
    },
    {
      "id": "E2",
      "title": "Kazakhstan: TLS interference and circumvention-website blocking",
      "countries": [
        "KZ"
      ],
      "period": "2023-06 to 2024-06",
      "mechanism_as_reported": "TLS interference including MITM intermediate certificates on multiple networks; confirmed blocking of at least 73 circumvention-tool websites (examples include NordVPN, ExpressVPN, ProtonVPN, OpenVPN, TunnelBear, Surfshark). Tor and Psiphon tools often remained reachable even when related websites were blocked.",
      "primary_sources": [
        {
          "org": "OONI / IFKZ / Eurasian Digital Foundation",
          "title": "Kazakhstan: TLS MITM attacks and blocking of news media, human rights, and circumvention tool sites",
          "url": "https://ooni.org/documents/OONI-Report-Kazakhstan-2024-English.pdf",
          "published": "2024-09-19"
        },
        {
          "org": "OONI",
          "title": "Research reports: Blocking of Circumvention Tools",
          "url": "https://ooni.org/reports/circumvention/",
          "published": "2024-09-19"
        }
      ],
      "what_we_measure_here": "Whether the same class of circumvention websites completes DNS/TLS/HTTPS from USA cloud (control).",
      "what_we_do_not_claim": "Replication of Kazakhstan TLS MITM from USA egress."
    },
    {
      "id": "E3",
      "title": "Iran: targeted VPN and circumvention-protocol disruption",
      "countries": [
        "IR"
      ],
      "period": "2023-12 to 2024-02; August 2024 follow-up reporting",
      "mechanism_as_reported": "Network monitors describe deliberate disruption of protocols used by circumvention tools (including OpenVPN-related reports and other obfuscated protocols) alongside policy pressure on VPN use.",
      "primary_sources": [
        {
          "org": "Filterwatch",
          "title": "Targeted VPN Protocol Disruption Following New Legislation",
          "url": "https://filter.watch/english/2024/04/02/network-monitor-feb-2024-targeted-vpn-protocol/",
          "published": "2024-04-02"
        },
        {
          "org": "Filterwatch",
          "title": "Iranian Officials Tacitly Declare War on Circumvention Tools",
          "url": "https://filter.watch/english/2024/09/16/network-and-policy-monitoring-august-2024-crackdown-on-vpn-by-iranian-authorities/",
          "published": "2024-09-16"
        }
      ],
      "what_we_measure_here": "USA website controls only; in-country protocol disruption remains DOCUMENT.",
      "what_we_do_not_claim": "Efficacy ranking of any VPN against Iranian filtering."
    },
    {
      "id": "E4",
      "title": "Myanmar: nationwide VPN restrictions from May 2024",
      "countries": [
        "MM"
      ],
      "period": "2024-05-30 onward (coverage through 2025 reports)",
      "mechanism_as_reported": "Orders and DPI-based blocking of VPN applications and related services; concurrent social-platform restrictions; Freedom House and Access Now document large-scale VPN inaccessibility and legal pressure. Human Rights Myanmar analyses audience impact after the May 2024 VPN block.",
      "primary_sources": [
        {
          "org": "Access Now",
          "title": "Worse than China or Iran? Myanmar\u2019s dangerous VPN ban",
          "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/myanmar-vpn-ban/",
          "published": "2024"
        },
        {
          "org": "Freedom House",
          "title": "Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2024",
          "url": "https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2024",
          "published": "2024"
        },
        {
          "org": "Freedom House",
          "title": "Myanmar: Freedom on the Net 2025",
          "url": "https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2025",
          "published": "2025"
        },
        {
          "org": "Human Rights Myanmar",
          "title": "The Great Firewall of Myanmar",
          "url": "https://humanrightsmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/HRM-the-great-firewall-of-myanmar.pdf",
          "published": "2024-10"
        }
      ],
      "what_we_measure_here": "USA reachability of VPN/Psiphon websites as a control baseline.",
      "what_we_do_not_claim": "In-Myanmar app installability or tunnel success from this VM."
    },
    {
      "id": "E5",
      "title": "Uganda: election-period social media and VPN website restrictions (2021)",
      "countries": [
        "UG"
      ],
      "period": "2021-01 (historical)",
      "mechanism_as_reported": "UCC-ordered blocking of social platforms and roughly 100 VPN services around the January 2021 election; OONI documented website anomalies including connection_reset patterns for several VPN domains, while Tor/Psiphon tool tests often still succeeded on measured networks.",
      "primary_sources": [
        {
          "org": "OONI",
          "title": "Uganda: Data on internet blocks and nationwide internet outage amid 2021 general election",
          "url": "https://ooni.org/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/",
          "published": "2021-01"
        },
        {
          "org": "Freedom House",
          "title": "Uganda: Freedom on the Net 2024 (historical context; VPN score improved later)",
          "url": "https://freedomhouse.org/country/uganda/freedom-net/2024",
          "published": "2024"
        }
      ],
      "what_we_measure_here": "Contemporary USA controls for the same website class; event itself is historical DOCUMENT.",
      "what_we_do_not_claim": "That 2021 Ugandan blocks are still active in 2026."
    }
  ]
}
